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Abstract
Consumption choices assist in solving the problem of how to convey and
recognize religious identities. In the communication of an identity, individuals
use the knowledge embedded in consumption norms, which restrict the range of
choices to a smaller set and abbreviate the required knowledge for encoding and
decoding messages. Using this knowledge as a shared framework for understanding, individuals with religious beliefs can choose consumption items that would
not only strengthen their beliefs but also help them express the intensity of their
commitments to these beliefs. Because individuals and societies have different
beliefs, norms, commitments, and expressive needs, consumption choice can help
to express these differences. Our explanation contrasts with incentive-based approaches that view religious consumption norms as solutions to free-rider problem
inherent in clubs.
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Abstract: Consumption choices assist in solving the problem of how to convey and
recognize religious identities. In the communication of an identity, individuals use the
knowledge embedded in consumption norms, which restrict the range of choices to a smaller
set and abbreviate the required knowledge for encoding and decoding messages. Using this
knowledge as a shared framework for understanding, individuals with religious beliefs can
choose consumption items that would not only strengthen their beliefs but also help them
express the intensity of their commitments to these beliefs. Because individuals and
societies have different beliefs, norms, commitments, and expressive needs, consumption
choice can help to express these differences. Our explanation contrasts with incentive-based
approaches that view religious consumption norms as solutions to free-rider problem
inherent in clubs.

INTRODUCTION
Religious beliefs and institutions have become important topics of inquiry in economics,
receiving increasing attention by even prominent mainstream economists.1 Whereas until
recently religious phenomena were typically considered outside of the domain of economics,
it has now become popular to provide explanations of these phenomena grounded in standard
economic theory. These explanations typically apply economic concepts and models by
viewing believers as rational consumers and religious organizations as clubs or firms that
collectively constitute a religious market.
Some of these studies have sought to explain the distinct and sometimes seemingly
strange patterns of consumption behavior that most religions prescribe. Among the well-
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known consumption prescriptions are the dietary guidelines such as the Catholics being
asked to abstain from eating meat on Fridays during Lent, vegetarianism for Hindus, and
Muslims and Jews abstaining from pork altogether. There are similarly well-known
prescriptions in clothing, grooming, art, music, charity, chastity, thriftiness, and so on, that
believers are asked to observe. The traditional approach to this these prescriptions had been
to view them as being outside of the realm of economic inquiry, belonging in the same black
box that includes tastes and preferences. A recent and influential approach, however, has
sought to explain these religious prescriptions by applying standard incentive theory and
viewing them as solutions to potential free-rider problems (Iannaccone, 1992).
Considering incentive based approaches to these phenomena as being misguided and
incomplete, we offer an explanation based on the communicative role of consumption. We
view general consumption guidelines as social institutions and argue that these institutions
serve the essential functions of storing the knowledge required for communication. Once an
individual makes a religious commitment (to a principle, individual, or group), he or she
acquires an identity. For many, this personal identity then needs to be expressed.
Consumption institutions assist in the communication of religious identities to others.

CONSUMPTION, INCENTIVES, AND COORDINATION
In an influential article that contributed significantly to the acceptance of the “Economics
of Religion” as a legitimate field of inquiry, Iannaccone (1992) extended standard
microeconomic analysis to the study of religious behavior.2 Rather than presuppose special
motives for religious activities, he modeled religion as a club good that brought positive
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returns to “participatory crowding” and noted that the collective character of religious
activity can lead to free-rider problems that cannot be easily overcome by explicit
monitoring. Borrowing insights from incentive-based theories, he showed how the free-rider
problem could be solved (at least theoretically) by seemingly strange and unproductive
religious requirements. Applying this approach to consumption, an incentive-based analysis
of religious prescriptions of consumption would thus seek to explain these restrictions by
examining how they make it possible for religious groups to identify committed members
and screen out free-riding imitators.
Although studying incentives might help to understand other phenomena in economics or
religion, we believe that consumption patterns and routines attributed to religion have little to
do with incentives and free-riding and much to do with imperfect knowledge and
communication. In a complex and uncertain world where individuals have only imperfect
knowledge about each other, religious consumption norms can serve as communicative
devices that lower the cost of expressing one's religious identity. They often indicate the
intensity of commitment, and perhaps even reinforce that commitment and help others
respect that commitment as well.
The starting point of our approach is to recognize the central roles of identity,
commitment, and integrity in religious behavior. Elsewhere we recently sought to explain
religious behavior by proposing a framework based on philosophical discussions on the
concept of integrity (Co"gel and Minkler, 2004).3 Adopting the notion of integrity defined as
identity-conferring commitments, we provided an alternative to economic explanations of
religious behavior based on preferences, opportunity sets, and social pressure. Although we
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did not deny that religious behavior might be guided directly by the distinct preferences of
religious people, constrained by available opportunities, or dictated by social pressure, we
argued that such explanations fail to explain some observed behavior. For a more
satisfactory explanation, we examined how one’s commitment to the religious dimension of
his or her identity affects behavior. To have integrity, an individual must have commitments
(internal requirements or constraints imposed on one’s own self), which in turn define his or
her identity. Developing these notions in a formal framework, we sought to explain such
anomalies as why people follow religious prescriptions even when no one else is present to
observe. We did not fully address, however, the function of religious prescriptions
themselves. We now build on these notions and examine how religious consumption norms
facilitate communication about identities.
Our approach to consumption norms is consistent with and supported by various recent
developments in economics. Shifting the point of emphasis from incentives to coordination
has been one of the central accomplishments of the emerging “capabilities view” in the
theory of organizations (for instance, Langlois and Foss 2003). In that literature, firms are
seen as solutions to the problem of coordinating dispersed knowledge capabilities rather than
as solutions to shirking and opportunistic behaviors. Similarly, the communicative
perspective that we adopt has been shared by recent developments in economic methodology,
where studies have sought to move away from modernist approaches that emphasize
problems with incentives (such as the search for a demarcation criterion and the concern with
the protection of prescribed methodologies) to those that emphasize how knowledge is
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communicated (McCloskey, 1994).4 The central importance of identity has also been
recently recognized in other fields of economics, incorporating the psychology and sociology
of identity into economic models of behavior (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002). Finally, the
function of norms and institutions in storing knowledge has been variously studied in recent
developments in institutional economics (Langlois, 1993; Co"gel, 1997).5

KNOWLEDGE AND RELIGIOUS CONSUMPTION NORMS
A religious commitment is often at the core of an individual’s sense of identity. Social
scientific studies of religion have shown the variety of ways in which religions powerfully
serve the identity impulse. As Seul (1999: 553) states, religions often serve various
psychological needs “more comprehensively and potently than other repositories of cultural
meaning that contribute to the construction and maintenance of individual and group
identities.” Each religion typically provides its followers with a distinct theology and a
coherent and stable set of norms, institutions, traditions, and moral values that provide the
basis for an individual to establish and maintain a secure identity.
Once an individual has decided upon a religious identity, there is often the need to
communicate that personal expression. The problem, which is central to this paper, is how
one's religious identity might be effectively expressed. One option could include lengthy,
time-consuming interactions with others. The cost of that process could increase further,
given the tacit nature of knowledge.
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Religious consumption norms provide a solution to the knowledge problem. Each
religion typically provides a distinct set of consumption norms that become the blueprint for
its followers. For example, Muslim women wear headscarves to cover their hair, and Jewish
men similarly wear yarmulke for religious expression. Other examples of religious
expression include distinctive styles in clothing and grooming, necklaces with the cross,
household decorations, and items like candles and ornaments that mark religious holidays.
Understanding the consumption of these items invite an analysis based not on the preferences
or incentives of individuals but one based on identity, commitment, and expression.
Individuals can use the blueprints that consumption norms provide in making their own
statements and expressions of commitment. A Muslim woman, for example, is able to
express her commitment by the color and style of her headscarf and how well it is covering
her hair. Sometimes seemingly trivial differences in style, color, and shape of a consumption
item may make significant statements about religious belonging and commitment. Among
the Amish, for example, the shape, color, or even the size of one’s hat, shirt, trousers, or
dress can mark subtle differences between groups and express one’s commitment.
Sometimes intense commitments are marked by minimal consumption patterns, as in the case
of Buddhist and Christian monks and nuns. A variety of factors can influence such
differences in individual expression, which we will explore in more detail in the next section.
Consumption norms provide not just the required language but also the rules that regulate
communication. These norms and regulations facilitate communication by both constraining
and enabling the construction of meaning. As constraints, they restrict the range of choices
available to an individual in encoding a message and the range of interpretations available to
the audience in understanding it. A Muslim woman, for example, can express her religious
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commitment by wearing a headscarf, but not by wearing a beret or a necklace. Similarly, the
audience is not at liberty to interpret her headscarf as a sign of her marital status, political
affiliation, or ethnic identity. Consumption norms include both formal and informal rules
that constrain the range of choices available for expression. What matters for them is not so
much that everyone agrees with or always follows them, but that they simply exist to define
meaning. Their existence provides a shared frame of reference and a common ground for
communication. By constraining both ends of the communication channel in the same way,
they allow individuals to use goods to stand for the same meaning as understood by the
audience.
As enablers, consumption norms facilitate communication by abbreviating the required
knowledge for encoding and decoding messages and by restricting the range of choices to a
smaller set. Because these norms can substitute for extensive reasoning and deliberation, less
effort is required to communicate and to generate meanings that elicit desired reactions.
Consumption norms thus assist us to cope with uncertainty by reducing the dimensions of our
problems of choice. They simplify the process by filtering and condensing the required
knowledge and by carrying it across time as memory. No individual has to start from scratch
or place unreasonable demands on his or her cognitive powers. Individuals who have only
limited knowledge of the religious identities and commitments of others can nevertheless
relate to each other through intersubjectively shared categories of communication provided
by consumption norms.
There are numerous instances in which individuals may need knowledge of other
people’s religious identities. Many of our choice problems, ranging from simple choices like
what to serve guests for dinner to more important decisions like whom to date or get married,
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directly involve other people, requiring us to be informed about their characteristics.
Sometimes the relevant and most important characteristic to know is religious identity.
Otherwise we may risk making seriously wrong and offensive choices, such as would be the
case if your date or guests were devout followers of the Jewish, Muslim, or Hindu faiths and
you had planned pork chops for dinner. What may be a trivial matter to you may turn out to
be vitally important to others. Because religion can be so important in people’s lives, being
courteous and making the right choices may require knowledge of their religious identities in
coordinating our relationships with friends and coworkers, during our involvement in social,
cultural, and political activities, and even during business dealings.
Finally, if consumption norms facilitate the communication of religious identity in the
ways we have described, then those same norms may also serve to strengthen religious
commitment in the first place. We can think of two ways. First, once an individual has
communicated a religious commitment it may become more real to him or her. Even if it is
not stated as a promise, to violate the meaning of something that one has communicated may
serve as a deterrent. Since some religious commitments can prove difficult to follow, that
added deterrent might be decisive. Secondly, once others know of an individual's religious
commitments, they might help the individual to stay on the steady path of fulfillment.
Sanctimonious behavior is often sanctioned formally and informally by others. Friends
sometimes help friends from falling to temptation, even if that temptation is not their own.

DIFFERENCES IN EXPRESSION
The existence of a religious norm does not by itself imply or guarantee that it is always
observed by all followers of a religion. Just as some Catholics may not be strictly observing
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the Lent, some Muslim women may not be covering their hair by a headscarf in public. Of
those women who cover their hair, some may not be covering it at all public occasions, for
example by leaving it uncovered during gatherings among close friends and family. Some
Jews may similarly be failing to observe some of the dietary restrictions or other
consumption guidelines prescribed by their religion. In general, not all religions utilize the
same types of consumption norms for religious expression or require their followers to
observe them perpetually; even when they do, not everyone observes them strictly.
To understand differences in religious consumption choices, we can separate influences
on them into two broad categories: social and personal. Although the social and personal
influences may be inextricably mixed, it is nevertheless useful to separate them analytically.
At the social level, there may be substantial differences among the formal and informal
norms of different religious traditions.6 Sometimes attempts are made to mold the religious
consumption norms with formal legal regulations on behavior, such as the recent laws
imposed in Afghanistan by the Taliban regime that required men to grow beards and women
to wear the Burka.7 Whereas these regulations sought to achieve conformity by requiring
everyone to display the same behavior, other regulations of consumption have sought to
prevent deviations from the desired norm by prohibiting some forms of religious expression.
For example, just as the Taliban regime introduced laws to regulate religious expression, the
French government has recently banned such expression in public schools, introducing laws
that prohibit headscarves, yarmulkes and large crosses. Although these formal laws (and
parallel ones observed in other countries like Iran and Turkey) clearly differ in their ultimate
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objectives and in being for or against religious expression, they commonly acknowledge the
knowledge embedded in these consumption norms and recognize the communicative role of
consumption.
Perhaps more common are the various informal norms that influence consumption
decisions. The importance of informal religious consumption norms has varied greatly
between religions and societies, depending on their historical, institutional, political, and
socio-economic background. These norms influence behavior by affecting the terms and
social value of religious expression. Their influence on behavior has recently become an
increasingly more controversial issue in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, where various
social, cultural, and economic conflicts and crises have been framed in religious terms,
making religious identities more prominent and attractive alternatives to secular ones.
Whereas religious identities and their careful communication were also important in past or
traditional societies, the importance and value of religious expression has typically
diminished in secular and economically advanced societies, religious identities being
gradually replaced by more secular ones. Within each religious tradition, both the nature of
these norms and the value of following or deviating from them can thus vary systematically
over time and across societies.
Although by studying differences in formal and informal norms we can understand how
religious consumption can vary systematically among different societies and religions, these
differences do not provide a complete explanation for why two followers of the same religion
in identical spatial and temporal conditions might display different consumption behavior.
For that we need to examine influences on consumption choices at the personal level.
Numerous differences among individuals, ranging from background and upbringing to
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beliefs and preferences, can affect choice. Although the standard theories of economic
choice typically leave these differences outside of analysis as belonging to the shaping of the
utility function, there has been progress toward understanding choice at a deeper level from
alternative approaches.8 Two of these approaches are particularly relevant for understanding
differences in religious consumption decisions. The first is to focus not on preferences or
utility but on other factors, such as commitment to a religious identity, which can also affect
choice. Adopting such an approach, we have previously examined choice as influenced by
the intensity of commitment to a religious identity (Co"gel and Minkler, 2004). Since people
vary in their level of commitment, so will their consumption choices reflecting that
commitment. Given the same need to express one's religious identity, the person with a
higher commitment will more closely follow the prescribed consumption norm, all else
equal.
Another approach that can help to analyze the communicative dimension of consumption
is to use the concept of expressive utility, derived from expressing a belief or preference, as
one of the separable components of the utility function. This concept has recently been
useful to explain various phenomena in economics, ranging from preference falsification to
hate speech and hate crimes (Kuran, 1995; Dharmapala and McAdams, 2002). In our
context, expressive utility can be interpreted as the utility gained from expressing a religious
identity through consumption. Just as individuals might have different religious beliefs and
commitment, their expressive utility from consuming goods might also be different. Even
the followers of the same religion in identical environments might thus choose different
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bundles of consumption as they balance their own expressive utility against the cost and
benefits imposed by the social environment.

CAVEATS AND DISCUSSION
In this section we offer some caveats to prevent misunderstandings, place our argument
in proper contexts, and discuss its implications for economic analysis of consumption. First,
it is important to emphasize that the explanation offered here is logically and conceptually
distinct from the one offered by Iannaccone (1992). Recall that he makes the problem of
free-riding in clubs central to his analysis. In contrast, we treat the problem as one of
communicating one's religious identity. So while both explain the same types of
consumption choices, we do so in very different ways. Moreover, while an enormous
literature has emerged from the idea of signals originated by Spence (1973), communication
of the sort we describe is different because it is not incentive-based. Signals provide
information in adverse selection contexts where individuals might otherwise try to
misrepresent themselves. In contrast, those trying to express a religious identity have no
such incentive or agenda.
Second, we address not the origins or primary intentions of religious consumption norms
but one of their functions in today’s societies. The origins of numerous norms commonly
attributed to a religion are often unknown or may even be based on unreliable oral histories.
Moreover, even when the original intention of a norm may have been explicitly and
uncontroversially stated in Holy Scriptures, its current function may be far removed from the
original intention. For example, the origins or intended outcomes of the prohibition of
interest by Islam or the restrictions on diet by most religions are not well known and

12

commonly understood by all followers. Although it may be important for a variety of
purposes to determine the origins and primary intentions of a religious consumption norm, it
is a separate and perhaps equally important objective to understand its communicative
function in a society. It is certainly important to determine the historical, social, and spiritual
origins of why Muslim women cover their hair and to examine whether the original intention
of this norm was to achieve modesty or distinction. That the origin or primary intention of
this norm may be unclear does not change the fact, however, that ways of observing it makes
a statement about religious identity and commitment. Even observing the norm halfheartedly
or refusing to observe it altogether make statements. By taking the origins of these norms as
given, we focus on how they facilitate religious expression.
Third, the effect of religious beliefs on consumption presents a serious challenge to the
fundamental assumption about the independence between beliefs and preferences.9 Whereas
the standard theory of rational choice considers beliefs as separate from preferences, the
analysis of choice as expression of religious identity and commitment suggests the presence
of a complicated relationship between them. For an intelligible consumption decision, an
individual needs to consider not only his own preferences for goods but also the relevant
religious norms and the beliefs and perceptions of other individuals. His or her decisions
involve more than a simple translation of personal preferences to consumption choices. An
appropriate analysis of these decisions thus requires an approach that does not take
consumption decisions as the simple outcome of a maximization problem but one that also
studies how consumption decisions communicate information about identities and
commitments.
9
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Last, consumption norms are not the only means for religious expression, and they do
more than the expression of religious identity. In addition to these norms, a variety of other
verbal and nonverbal phenomena exist to facilitate expression. In addition to expressing
identity, these norms also assist in such things as commitment, group cohesion and member
recruitment. By focusing on the communication of religious identities, we only seek to
highlight an understudied dimension of consumption.
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